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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
A jury in the U.S. District Court for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania found Appellants Walter Cross, Jules 
Melograne, and Nunzio Melograne guilty of one count each 
of conspiracy to deprive Pennsylvania residents of their civil 
right to fair and impartial trial, 18 U.S.C. S 241, and 
conspiracy to commit mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. SS 371 and 
1341. All three defendants appeal both convictions. They 
assert that the civil rights conviction is based on a vague 
and undefined theory that cannot support a criminal 
conviction, and that the only mailings involved were not 
sufficiently connected to the fraudulent scheme to bring it 
within the federal mail fraud statute. We hold that 
established precedent provided clear notice to the 
defendants that their agreement would constitute a 
conspiracy to violate a civil right of the victims of that 
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agreement; therefore, we affirm the convictions for 
conspiracy to violate civil rights. We reverse the mail fraud 
conspiracy conviction, however, because none of the 
mailings contemplated in the conspiracy was undertaken 
"for the purpose of executing" the scheme to defraud 
Pennsylvania and its citizens of honest government 
services. 
 
I. Background 
 
From December 1990 through July 1993, Cross and the 
Melogranes conspired to "fix" cases coming before the 
Statutory Appeals Division of the Court of Common Pleas of 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (the "Statutory Appeals 
Court"). In statutory appeals, the court exercises de novo 
review of the decisions of courts of the "minor judiciary" on 
matters such as traffic offenses and municipal ordinance 
violations. Jules Melograne was a District Justice who 
presided over one of the courts of the minor judiciary. 
Cross was the supervisor of the Statutory Appeals Court in 
Allegheny County, where he performed a number of duties, 
including (1) determining when defendants, attorneys, and 
witnesses (most often police officers) were present to begin 
hearings, (2) controlling the order of hearings, (3) handling 
requests for postponements, and (4) signing pay vouchers 
for police officers who had appeared as witnesses. Nunzio 
Melograne was the "tipstaff" for the judge assigned to hear 
statutory appeals. He kept the court calendar, maintained 
the case files, called the cases, and swore the witnesses. 
 
Viewing the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to 
the government, the record indicates that Cross and the 
Melogranes conspired to influence the decisions of the court 
in a variety of ways. Most frequently, they would utilize 
their authority and access to the decision maker to assure 
resolution of the case in the defendants' favor. Cross 
repeatedly procured the absence of police officer witnesses 
at hearings by telling them that they were not needed, 
asking them to leave, or by calling the hearings early, 
before the police witnesses had arrived. These tactics led to 
automatic not-guilty verdicts. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 86(f). 
Cross asked the judge not to rule on certain cases during 
the hearing, but to take them under advisement, or "c.a.v." 
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After the hearings had concluded, Cross and Nunzio 
Melograne would accompany the judge to his chambers 
with the c.a.v. cases, and after fifteen to twenty minutes 
they would emerge with several not-guilty verdicts. FBI 
surveillance also recorded Cross discussing defendants 
being found not guilty "because Jules wants it," App. at 
929, presumably referring to Jules Melograne. Witnesses 
reported that they had observed stars, check marks, or 
"c.a.v." notations by defendants' names on Cross's trial 
calendar before they had appeared; such defendants 
normally were found not guilty or received reduced 
sentences at their hearings. In addition, Cross was 
observed accepting food, tickets to sporting events, fruit 
baskets, and other items despite his office's policy against 
employees accepting gifts. Witnesses testified that the gifts 
had been offered in exchange for promises by Cross to 
reduce or eliminate citations and to influence hearings. 
 
On other occasions, Cross and the Melogranes would 
work to assure that a case would be decided against the 
defendant--as the government called them, the "to be found 
guilty" cases. One witness testified that she had overheard 
Cross telling the judge in one case to "find this sucker 
guilty," and on another occasion, the defendant was found 
guilty after Cross's prompting to the judge even though the 
assistant district attorney at the hearing had attempted to 
withdraw the charge on the ground that the evidence did 
not demonstrate a violation. In yet another case, FBI agents 
recorded one of Cross's telephone conversations in which 
the husband of an accident victim called Cross and asked 
that the case against the woman who had caused the 
accident be heard first on its scheduled hearing date. In the 
course of their discussion, Cross asked, "You want her 
guilty, right?" and after the caller replied affirmatively, 
Cross assured him, "Guilty? No problem." App. at 915. 
Cross later told the victim's husband that "we'll burn her 
ass." App. at 925. 
 
Nunzio Melograne also was seen speaking to police 
witnesses on at least one occasion before the police left the 
court before their hearings. In addition, he kept a notebook 
listing approximately 170 cases, and the name "Jules," 
again referring to Jules Melograne, appeared in connection 
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with 82 of those, many of which had been marked on 
Cross's trial list. At least three cases in which defendants 
were found not guilty were marked on Cross's trial calendar 
and listed in Nunzio Melograne's notebook with the name 
"Jules." And at least three cases in which a defendant was 
found guilty appeared in Nunzio Melograne's notebook with 
the word "guilty," including the one described above where 
the district attorney attempted to withdraw the charge. 
 
The government based its civil rights charge on matters 
in which the conspirators had procured guilty verdicts--the 
"to be found guilty" cases. In these cases Cross and the 
Melogranes, the government charged, conspired to deprive 
defendants appearing before the Statutory Appeals Court of 
their fundamental due process right to a fair hearing before 
an impartial tribunal. The mail fraud convictions were 
based on the conspirators' agreement to deprive 
Pennsylvania and its citizens of their own honest services 
as public employees.1 It was alleged that, in furtherance of 
this agreement, they caused the mail to be used to transmit 
notices of case dispositions to parties and the Pennsylvania 
Department of Transportation. 
 
The district court properly exercised jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. S 3231, and we invoke jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291 to review the district court'sfinal order of 
conviction. Because each of Appellants' challenges is based 
on the district court's construction of statutes and case 
law, we will exercise plenary review. Epstein Family 
Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
II. Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights 
 
The statute under which the defendants were convicted, 
18 U.S.C. S 241, makes it a crime for "two or more persons 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The government argued before us that the alleged mail fraud 
conspiracy had two objectives: to deprive citizens of the honest services 
of public employees and to deprive the Commonwealth of fines. Without 
objection from the government, however, the case was submitted by the 
district court to the jury as a conspiracy with the single objective of 
depriving citizens of the honest services of the defendants. App. at 242- 
43; 1109-11. 
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[to] conspire to injure . . . any person in any . . . state or 
Commonwealth . . . in the free exercise or enjoyment of any 
right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws 
of the United States." The evidence indicates that Cross and 
the Melogranes agreed to use their best efforts to cause the 
judge in the "to be found guilty" cases to consider factors 
other than the merits of the case and to find against the 
defendant. Cross and the Melogranes insist that they had 
no fair notice that this agreement would violate S 241. 
Because the fundamental due process right of a defendant 
in a criminal case to an impartial tribunal is so well 
established, and because that right is so clearly subverted 
by an agreement of this kind, we reject the defendants' 
contention that they had no fair notice. 
 
The right to a fair and impartial trial for the resolution of 
guilt lies at the very heart of the constitutional guarantee of 
due process, as the case law of the Supreme Court and this 
circuit reflects. In In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), a 
Michigan judge who had presided over a one-person "judge- 
grand jury" later, in separate proceedings, adjudged 
witnesses in contempt for their conduct before him at the 
hearing. Id. at 133-34. The Supreme Court held this to be 
a violation of due process, opening its discussion of the law 
with the following passage: "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is 
a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course 
requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But 
our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even 
the probability of unfairness." Id. at 136. The Court warned 
that " `[e]very procedure which would offer a possible 
temptation to the average man as a judge . . . not to hold 
the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the 
accused denies the latter due process of law.' " Id. (quoting 
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)). Similarly, the 
Court held in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980) 
that "[t]he Due Process Clause entitles a person to an 
impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and 
criminal cases." 446 U.S. at 242. Among the concerns 
protected by this rule, the Court noted, is the preservation 
of 
 
         both the appearance and reality of fairness, "generating 
         the feeling, so important to a popular government, that 
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         justice has been done" by ensuring that no person will 
         be deprived of his interests in the absence of a 
         proceeding in which he may present his case with 
         assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed tofind 
         against him. 
 
Id. (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 172 (1951)). 
 
This circuit has also clearly acknowledged the 
fundamental right to a fair and unbiased adjudication of 
guilt. We defined the basic elements of due process not 
simply as notice and the opportunity to be heard, 2 but "to 
be heard by a fair and impartial tribunal." Sill v. 
Pennsylvania State Univ., 462 F.2d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 1972) 
(emphasis added). Moreover, we announced unambiguously 
that "[i]f someone is deprived of his right to an impartial 
tribunal, then he is denied his constitutional right to due 
process, regardless of the magnitude of the individual and 
state interest at stake, the risk of error and the likely value 
of additional safeguards." United Retail & Wholesale 
Employees Teamsters Union Local No. 115 Pension Plan v. 
Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128, 138 (3d Cir. 1985). 
Indeed, we emphasized that "[t]he unfairness that results 
from biased decisionmakers strikes so deeply at our sense 
of justice that it differs qualitatively from the injury that 
results from insufficient procedures." Id. 
 
The defendants attempt to escape the clear import of 
these teachings by pointing out that they arose in the 
context of misconduct on the part of the decision maker, 
and that no decided case imposes criminal liability for 
violating S 241 by influencing or attempting to influence a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The defendants claim that all of those whom they conspired to injure 
received the fundamental tenets of due process: notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. But due process cannot be satisfied when the 
state provides a "hearing" at which the judge is not really listening or 
before which the decision has already been made. A myriad of cases hold 
that mere notice and hearing are not enough if "the state has contrived 
a conviction through the pretense of trial." See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 
294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (deliberate presentation of perjured testimony 
by the State); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (same); Pyle v. 
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942) (same). 
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decision maker. However, where, as here, the civil right 
allegedly violated is defined in the preexisting case law in a 
way that gave clear notice that the defendant's proposed 
conduct would abridge it, a prior conviction on analogous 
facts is not necessary. This is clear from the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in United States v. Lanier, 117 S. 
Ct. 1219 (1997). 
 
Lanier was convicted under 18 U.S.C. S 242 for violating 
the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them 
sexually while he was serving as a state judge. Section 242 
prohibits "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or 
laws of the United States" by anyone acting "under color of 
. . . law."3 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the 
conviction for "lack of any notice to the public that this 
ambiguous criminal statute included simple or sexual 
assault crimes within its coverage." United States v. Lanier, 
73 F.3d 1380, 1384 (6th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals 
had employed an incorrect standard for determining 
whether particular conduct falls within the proscriptions of 
S 242. United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997). As 
the Court pointed out, the "touchstone is whether the 
statute, either standing alone or as construed by the 
courts, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that 
the defendant's conduct was criminal." Id. at 1225. 
 
The Court of Appeals in Lanier recognized two 
prerequisites for a conviction under S 242: (1) a prior 
decision of the Supreme Court recognizing the constitutional 
right at issue, and (2) a prior conviction in a factual 
situation "fundamentally similar" to the one at bar. The 
Supreme Court rejected this view. It noted that no case has 
confined the range of relevant decisions to Supreme Court 
precedent. Id. at 1226. As for factual similarity, the Court 
pointed out that it had upheld convictions under S 241 
despite "notable factual distinctions" between prior 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 242 is thus the substantive counterpart to the conspiracy 
statute in 18 U.S.C. S 241, which is the focus of this appeal. Section 241 
forbids conspiracies to violate federally protected rights, whether the 
conspirators act under color of law or not. 
 
                                8 
 
 
 
decisions and the convictions at issue "so long as the prior 
decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct at 
issue violated constitutional rights." Id. at 1227. It 
conceded that "[i]n some circumstances, as when an earlier 
case expressly leaves open whether a general rule applies to 
the particular type of conduct at issue, a very high degree 
of prior factual particularity may be necessary." Id. "But," 
the Court continued, 
 
         general statements of the law are not inherently 
         incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in other 
         instances a general constitutional rule already 
         identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious 
         clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though 
         "the very action in question has [not] previously been 
         held unlawful." 
 
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 
(1987)). 
 
This case falls squarely within the language just quoted. 
No earlier case leaves open whether prejudicing a judge 
against a defendant violates the defendant's right to a fair 
and impartial trial; rather, the "general constitutional rule 
already identified in the decisional law"--that people are 
entitled to fair adjudication of their guilt before an impartial 
tribunal--"applies with obvious clarity to the specific 
conduct in question." We therefore affirm the conviction for 
conspiracy to violate civil rights. 
 
III. Mail Fraud Conspiracy 
 
The defendants were convicted of a conspiracy that 
contemplated using the United States mail to deprive the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its citizens of the 
honest services of public employees. The indictment alleges 
that this agreement contemplated that the defendants 
would cause the following documents to be sent through 
the United States mail by the Statutory Appeals Court to 
the parties and the Department of Transportation ("DOT"): 
(1) notices of dismissals, (2) notices of convictions, and (3) 
"notices of favorable disposition." App. at 42, 51, 53. The 
government insists that the defendants contemplated that 
these documents would be sent through the mail in 
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furtherance of their conspiracy. While we agree that the 
record will support an inference that the defendants 
expected these notices to be dispatched by mail, we cannot 
uphold the defendants' mail fraud convictions on this basis. 
Because mailing of these notices was required by law as an 
integral and necessary part of the court's adjudication of 
cases, and because any deprivation of the honest services 
of public employees had been completed in each instance 
before the notice of disposition was mailed, the mailings of 
notices of case disposition as a matter of law were not in 
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. 
 
"The mail fraud statute does not purport to reach all 
frauds, but only those limited instances in which the use of 
the mails is part of the execution of the fraud." Kann v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 88, 95 (1944). As we explained in 
United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 471-72 (3d Cir. 
1977) (internal citations omitted): 
 
         In each case the question is whether or not the 
         "mailings were sufficiently closely related to 
         respondent's scheme to bring his conduct within the 
         statute." Moreover . . . "the close relation of the 
         mailings to the scheme does not turn on time or space, 
         but on the dependence in some way of the completion 
         of the scheme or the prevention of its detection on the 
         mailings in question." Thus, mailings taking place after 
         the object of the scheme has been accomplished, or 
         before its accomplishment has begun, are not 
         sufficiently closely related to the scheme to support a 
         mail fraud prosecution. Nor are routine mailings 
         required by law which are themselves intrinsically 
         innocent even though they take place during the 
         course of carrying out a fraudulent scheme, the 
         objective of which is the embezzlement of funds 
         received in response to the mailings. 
 
We derived these governing principles in Tarnopol in large 
part from Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370 (1960), a case 
factually similar to that before us. The defendants in Parr 
were charged with a scheme to embezzle funds from a 
public school district in Texas. The mailings alleged to have 
been in furtherance of their conspiracy included notices of 
tax assessments dispatched by the district to local 
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residents and the tax payments sent to it in response. 
Incoming tax revenue was either immediately converted by 
the defendants or deposited in the district's account, on 
which the defendants issued and cashed checks payable to 
fictitious persons or in consideration of fictitious goods and 
services. The scheme also allegedly included the 
defendants' securing gasoline and other products and 
services with school district credit cards, with the 
knowledge that the mails would be used to collect from 
school funds. Although the Court acknowledged this 
"brazen scheme to defraud," it explained that the offenses 
described were essentially state crimes, and they would 
constitute federal mail fraud only if the mailings charged in 
the indictment were made " `for the purpose of executing 
such scheme.' " Parr, 363 U.S. at 385 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
S 1341). 
 
Because the district was legally compelled to assess and 
collect taxes for school purposes, and the taxpayers were 
legally obliged to respond, the Court held that the mailings 
in connection with the collection of revenue could not 
support a mail fraud conviction even though the scheme to 
embezzle could not have succeeded without tax revenue. 
Rejecting the government's arguments that the mailings, 
even if innocent in themselves, were "steps in a plot," the 
Court remarked that no case had ever held that "a thing 
which the law required to be mailed may be regarded as 
mailed for the purpose of executing a plot or scheme to 
defraud." Id. at 390. The Court stressed that: (1) the district 
was legally required to assess and collect taxes; (2) the 
indictment did not charge and the evidence did not prove 
that the taxes assessed exceeded the district's legitimate 
needs or that they were in any way unlawful; and (3) in 
fulfilling its legal duty to collect and report the receipt of 
taxes, the district was practically obliged to permit 
taxpayers to use the mail. Id. at 391. In a passage of 
central importance to this appeal, the Court summarized its 
holding with respect to the tax collection mailings as 
follows: 
 
         [I]t cannot be said that mailings made for or caused to 
         be made under the imperative command of duty 
         imposed by state law are criminal under the federal 
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         mail fraud statute, even though some of those who are 
         so required to do the mailing . . . plan to steal . . . 
         some indefinite part of [the district's] moneys. 
 
Id. 
 
The Court also held that the mailings required to collect 
for the credit card purchases would not support a mail 
fraud conviction. The "scheme in each case had reached 
fruition when [the defendants] received the goods and 
services . . . . It was immaterial . . . to any consummation 
of the scheme, how the [oil company] . . . would collect from 
the [District]." Id. at 393 (quoting Kann v. United States, 
323 U.S. 88, 94 (1944)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
Accordingly, it could not be said "that the mailings in 
question were for the purpose of executing the scheme, as 
the statute requires." Id. 
 
Parr's holding with respect to the credit card portion of 
the scheme was followed in United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 
395 (1974). Maze also involved credit card fraud. The Court 
held that mailings of credit card invoices from a motel to a 
bank for the purpose of securing reimbursement for the 
goods and services supplied to Maze by the motel were not 
"for the purpose of executing [the defendant's] scheme." Id. 
at 405. The Court pointed out that Maze's "scheme reached 
fruition when he checked out of the motel." Id. at 414. In 
reaching its conclusion, the Court distinguished United 
States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), on the ground that, 
while Maze had received no benefit from the mailings, the 
mailings in the Sampson scheme "were designed to lull the 
victims into a false sense of security, postpone their 
ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make 
the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no 
mailings had taken place." Id. at 403. 
 
We find this case indistinguishable from Parr. The 
Statutory Appeals Court was charged by law with 
adjudicating specified cases, just as the school district in 
Parr was charged with running a school system. Its 
mailings to the parties and the DOT, like the tax mailing in 
Parr, were required by law as a part of the court's exercise 
of its responsibilities. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 58(b)(2), 63(b)(2), 
68(b)(2), 80, 9024, 9025; Pa. R. Civ. P. 236(a)(2); Pa. Stat. 
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Ann. tit. 75, S 6323 (West 1996). Given the volume of 
business that the court conducted, it had little choice but 
to transmit these required notifications by mail. The notices 
of dispositions dispatched by the court, like the tax 
mailings in Parr, performed precisely the function they were 
intended by law to perform: they faithfully reported the 
court's disposition of the case. As in Parr, the relevant 
mailings would, of necessity, have been made whether or 
not the conspiracy existed, and they would have performed 
precisely the same function in the absence of the 
conspiracy that they performed during its continuance. 
 
We also find an analogy between this case and the credit 
card aspects of Parr and of Maze. The objective of this 
conspiracy was to deprive citizens of the honest services of 
public employees charged with processing and adjudicating 
cases. That objective would "reach fruition" when the 
defendants' efforts caused a different disposition by the 
court than would otherwise have been made. In short, all 
that the conspirators needed to fix in order to achieve the 
object of their agreement was the disposition of a case. 
While routine mailings to the parties and the DOT and 
between the DOT and the parties could reasonably have 
been expected to follow in the ordinary execution of duties 
imposed by law, by the time notices of dispositions were 
dispatched, the conspiracy had either succeeded or failed, 
the legal consequences of an acquittal or conviction had 
been established, and the routine reporting of the 
dispositions simply was not a part of the conspirators' 
execution of their scheme. Nor did that routine reporting 
have the effect of lulling anyone into a false sense of 
security or otherwise making the conspirators' 
apprehension less likely.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989), a case relied upon 
heavily by the government, appears to us to support the position of the 
defendants. In Schmuck, a used car distributor was charged with 
devising and executing a scheme to defraud retail automobile customers 
by rolling back the odometers and inflating the prices he charged to 
dealers based on the lower mileage readings. The Court held that the 
mailing requirement was satisfied by the dealers' mailings of the title 
application forms. The Court distinguished Parr on the basis that the 
annual tax mailings in Parr continued regularly regardless of the 
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The scope of the federal mail fraud statute is limited. The 
Supreme Court has clearly held that legally required 
mailings in circumstances like those in this case cannot be 
deemed to have been made "for the purpose of executing" a 
fraudulent scheme. We therefore reverse the mail fraud 
conspiracy convictions.5 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
convictions for conspiracy to violate civil rights and will 
reverse the convictions for conspiracy to commit mail fraud. 
We will remand for resentencing. 
 
A True Copy: 
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Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
scheme, while the mailings from the dealers in Schmuck were a direct 
result of and would not have occurred but for the fraudulent scheme. 
Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 713 n.7. Here also, the court regularly mailed 
notices to parties and the DOT in every case, whether or not the 
defendants had attempted to influence the result. 
 
5. In a footnote in its brief, the government points to testimony that the 
defendants caused notices to be mailed of the time, date, and place of 
the hearings in the various cases. Appellee's Br. at 36 n.4. Even if these 
had been alleged in the indictment to be mailings in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, we could not sustain the defendants' mail fraud convictions 
on the basis of these notices. They too are a necessary part of the 
Statutory Appeals Court's carrying out its charge to adjudicate the cases 
within its jurisdiction. These notices were sent in all cases and their 
function was precisely the same during the conspiracy as it would have 
been without that conspiracy. 
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